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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 




 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from 
an August 15, 2005 order of the District Court entered August 
16, 2005, denying appellant LaFond James Houck‟s petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus and adopting as the opinion of the Court 
a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge dated June 
21, 2005, recommending that the Court deny the petition.  The 
magistrate judge filed her report and recommendation after 
respondents, officers of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the 
appellees on this appeal, filed an answer to Houck‟s petition and 
Houck, in turn, filed a traverse to the answer.  The magistrate 
judge, and thus the District Court, predicated a portion of the 
opinion on Houck‟s failure to present certain claims in the 
Pennsylvania state courts, an omission causing the magistrate 
judge, and thus the District Court, to determine that they were 
barred from considering those claims on their merits.  Houck 
appealed and we granted a certificate of appealability on the 
following issue:  “whether [Houck‟s] procedural default should 
be excused on the basis of newly presented evidence of his 
actual innocence.”  Thus, we deal only with that issue and do not 
review the opinion‟s disposition of the issues not procedurally 
barred on their merits. 
 
 
II.  FACTS 
 
 On the afternoon of October 13, 1997, two masked men 
dressed in black attacked Andre Freeman while he was sitting 
inside his car at Grove Place, a residential area in the Hill 
District of Pittsburgh.  After the assailants dragged Freeman 
from his car, beat him and threatened him with a firearm, they 
 
 4 
forced him into the trunk of their own car, a red Ford Taurus.  
Freeman, however, would not fit in the trunk, so the assailants 
lowered the Taurus‟s back seat thus allowing part of Freeman‟s 
body to protrude into the car‟s passenger compartment.  
Fortunately there were witnesses to the attack who called the 
police and told them what they had seen. 
 
 Later in the evening of the same day two Pittsburgh 
police officers noticed a red Taurus matching the eye witnesses‟ 
description and consequently the officers followed the Taurus.  
Eventually its operator, Houck, drove the Taurus into a gas 
station and parked.  There was one passenger, Charlie Turner, in 
the Taurus.  After seeing the officers, Turner began walking 
away from the gas station, dropping a gun and a black pullover 
as he walked.  When an officer pursued Turner he fled but the 
police overtook and captured him.   The police recovered the 
gun and pullover and, in addition, in their search of Turner at the 
time of his arrest, they found a mask in his right sock. 
 
 Subsequently, the police officers found Freeman, who 
was partially in the trunk and partially in the Taurus‟s back seat, 
a position made possible because, as we have explained, the rear 
seat of the Taurus was folded down enabling Freeman to 
protrude from the trunk into the back seat.  Freeman, who was 
bloody, told the officers that he had been shot. 
 
 A gas station attendant approached the officers and 
pointed to a black Pontiac Grand Prix parked at the gas station.  
One of the officers approached the Grand Prix and found 
Houck, who was wearing a bloody white T-shirt and had a black 
sweater in his lap, inside.  The officers also found a gun nearby. 
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 The police then arrested and searched Houck, finding a mask in 
his pants pocket.
1
   
 
 Charges to which Houck pleaded not guilty were filed 
against him arising from the events we have described, and a 
jury trial at which Houck testified and maintained his innocence 
ensued.
 2
  Houck explained that during the late afternoon of 
October 13, 1999, he picked up his son at his school, the Mt. 
Zion Christian Academy, and then took him home.  Houck 
testified that the blood on his T-shirt was not from an assault on 
Freeman but was from his role in breaking up a fight between 
his fiancée‟s mother and the mother‟s boyfriend.  Houck also 
testified that after that fight, Turner and two other men in the 
Taurus picked him up and, after Houck and Turner dropped the 
two other men off, he and Turner went to the gas station where 
the police arrested him.  Houck claimed that he was unaware of 
the assault on Freeman and did not know that Freeman was in 
the Taurus when he, Houck, was in that car. 
 
 Notwithstanding Houck‟s denials, the jury convicted him 
of kidnapping, aggravated assault, carrying a firearm without a 
                                                 
1. Houck claims that the item retrieved from his pocket was a 
skullcap. 
 
2. At the trial the prosecution introduced evidence that after the 
police took Houck to a police station and gave him his Miranda 
rights, he made an oral confession that a detective recorded on 
paper.  Though the defense argued that Houck had not given the 
statement and pointed out that he had not signed it, the Court 
allowed the statement to be used at the trial. 
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license, reckless endangerment, and criminal conspiracy.  
Ultimately the state trial court sentenced him on the various 
charges to a cumulative indeterminate term of 15 to 30 years 
incarceration.  Houck then appealed. 
 
 Houck asserts that he asked his appellate counsel, who 
had not been his trial counsel, to pursue several issues on the 
appeal of his state conviction, including his trial counsel‟s 
incompetency in failing to investigate fully Houck‟s alibi but he 
failed to do so.    In particular, Houck believed that trial counsel 
should have examined the student log book at his son‟s school 
because Houck believed that it would have shown that he had 
been picking up his son at the time of the assault on Freeman.
3
  
Moreover, Houck thought that witnesses who had been at the 
school could confirm his assertion about having picked up his 
                                                 
3. In Houck‟s brief on this appeal he indicates that after 
respondents “raised the issue of procedural default in their 
Answer to the petition/ amended petition [he] filed a Traverse, 
attaching exhibits which established that he had requested by 
letter to his original appellate counsel, that these very issues of 
trial counsel‟s ineffectiveness be raised on appeal.”  Appellant‟s 
br. at 10.  Houck‟s pinpoint citation supporting this statement is 
to appendix at 136 but that page does not support his assertion.  
Houck‟s traverse, however, refers to Houck‟s trial counsel‟s 
failure to discover the log book and it makes clear that Houck 
asked his original appellate counsel to raise some issues of trial 
counsel‟s incompetency.  In the circumstances, we will assume 
that Houck made a request to appellate counsel to pursue the log 




son.  Appellate counsel, however, did not pursue this ineffective 
assistance of counsel issue, focusing instead on other matters, 
including a different ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. 
 On Houck‟s appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed 
the judgment of conviction and sentence, and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denied further discretionary review.   
 
 Houck then sought post-conviction relief under 
Pennsylvania‟s Post-Conviction Relief Act.  His petition, 
however, did not address his trial counsel‟s failure to investigate 
his alibi or his appellate counsel‟s failure to raise that issue on 
the direct appeal, though it did address other ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims with respect to his counsel on direct 
appeal.  Houck‟s petition was unsuccessful both in the state trial 
and appellate courts. 
 
 Houck then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
the District Court.  Houck‟s federal habeas corpus petition 
advanced six claims,
4
 and he later filed an amended petition 
                                                 
4. In the petition Houck claimed: 
 Appellate counsel gave ineffective assistance for failing 
to raise the claim that trial  counsel gave ineffective 
assistance for improperly advising appellate [sic] not to 
present character testimony; 
 Appellate counsel gave ineffective assistance for failing 
to argue that trial counsel  gave ineffective assistance 
for failing to request an instruction that the defense witness 
had no duty to contact the police or district attorney‟s [sic]; 
 Appellate counsel gave ineffective assistance for failing 
to argue that the trial  court erred, over objection, in 
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asserting five additional claims.
5
  The relevant claims for our 
purposes all assert that Houck‟s trial counsel failed to gather 
evidence that would have supported his defense.  Houck 
asserted that his counsel had been ineffective and, in this regard, 
cited Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 
                                                                                                             
allowing hearsay testimony to be presented; 
 Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call alibi 
witness Tracy . . . ; 
 Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate alibi 
defense . . . ; 
 Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the 
crime scene. 
 
App. at 30-36. 
 
5. In the amended petition Houck claimed trial counsel was 
ineffective for: 
Failure to investigate all the facts necessary to formulate 
a plausible alibi defense; 
Failure to investigate and/or interview potential witness 
Everett Carmack; 
Failure to go to scene of crime to locate potential 
eyewitnesses; 
Failure to investigate and use available 
corroborating/rebuttal evidence; 
Failure to investigate medical records and circumstances 
surrounding  
statements  of Andre Freeman. 
 





 Respondents opposed the petition, arguing that Houck 
had not exhausted certain claims in the state courts and, 
therefore, those claims were procedurally defaulted.  Houck 
filed a traverse admitting those claims had been defaulted, but 
arguing that this default should be excused because his attorney 
on his direct appeal from the conviction and sentence had failed 
to raise these claims despite Houck‟s explicit request that he do 
so.  Accordingly, Houck relied on the “cause and prejudice 
exception” to the procedural default rule as authority for the 
Court to entertain his defaulted claims.  The Supreme Court 
explained that exception in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991), as follows:  “In all cases 
in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state 
court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural 
rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the 
prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual 
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law . . . .” 
 The Supreme Court then went on to explain that an attorney‟s 
ignorance or inadvertence is not cause but:  “Attorney error that 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel is cause . . . .”  Id. at 
753-54, 111 S.Ct. at 2566-67.  To support his assertion of 
counsel‟s ineffectiveness, Houck attached his correspondence 




                                                 
6. As we indicated above, see supra n.3, we cannot be sure that 
the correspondence included a request that his counsel pursue an 




 Although Houck in his traverse to the answer to the 
petition did not explicitly argue that his procedural default 
should be excused because of new evidence of actual innocence, 
he did attach several new affidavits that he obviously intended 
to establish that he was innocent of the offenses for which the 
jury had convicted him.  In the circumstances, we regard his 
claim of actual innocence on which we granted the certificate of 
appealability as preserved for review in this Court.  See Hubbard 
v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
 The District Court referred Houck‟s petition to a 
magistrate judge, who concluded that certain claims had not 
been exhausted in the state courts and thus were barred.  The 
magistrate judge rejected Houck‟s argument regarding the 
“cause and prejudice exception” to the procedural default 
doctrine, but did not consider whether evidence of Houck‟s 
actual innocence excused his procedural default in the state 
courts.  This omission was understandable inasmuch as Houck 
did not explicitly raise an actual innocence claim in his petition 
or his traverse.  The magistrate judge rejected Houck‟s 
remaining claims on the merits.
 7 
                                                 
7. The magistrate judge questioned whether appellate counsel 
was ineffective, but noted that even assuming that he was 
ineffective Houck should have presented that claim in his post-
conviction relief proceedings in the state courts.  See Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645-46 (1986) 
(“Ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause for a procedural 
default.  However, we think that the exhaustion doctrine . . . 
generally requires that a claim of ineffective assistance be 




 Houck filed objections to the magistrate judge‟s report 
and recommendation in which he contended that the District 
Court should excuse his default because he had presented new 
evidence of actual innocence.
8
  Houck cited Schlup v. Delo, 513 
U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995), in support of his position.  In its 
order of August 15, 2005, the District Court found Houck‟s 
objections “to be without merit” and adopted the magistrate 
judge‟s report and recommendation without discussing Houck‟s 
assertion of actual innocence.  This appeal and our grant of a 
certificate of appealability followed.
9
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254 and we have jurisdiction over the District Court‟s final 
order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253.  We are exercising 
plenary review on this appeal as the District Court in this 
procedural default case did not conduct an evidentiary hearing.  
See Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2007); Duncan 
v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2001). 
   
 
                                                                                                             
may be used to establish cause for a procedural default.”). 
 
8. His claim of actual innocence in his objections reinforces our 
determination to regard that claim as preserved for our 
consideration. 
 
9. Houck filed a motion for reconsideration in the District Court 
on August 29, 2005, which the Court denied on September 9, 




III.  DISCUSSION 
 
 A.  Excusing Default Based on Evidence of Actual 
Innocence 
 
 A district court ordinarily cannot grant a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus arising from a petitioner‟s custody under a 
state court judgment unless the petitioner first has exhausted his 
available remedies in state court.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).  
However, there is a narrow class of cases in which, in order to 
avoid a fundamental miscarriage of justice, evidence of a 
petitioner‟s actual innocence can excuse his failure to exhaust 
his state court remedies.  McCleskey v . Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 
494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991); Hubbard, 378 F.3d at 338.
10
  
A case in which a petitioner seeks to excuse his procedural 
default by advancing a claim of actual innocence is known as a 
“gateway” case.  See, e.g., Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 122.  In a 
gateway case the court initially examines the question of 
whether a petitioner‟s procedural default should be excused, 
thereby allowing him to present evidence of a constitutional 
violation that infected his original trial.  In this case the 
constitutional violation that Houck sought to advance was that 
he had had ineffective assistance of counsel in the state courts.  
Thus, we are not dealing here with a “freestanding” claim of 
innocence case in which a petitioner advances a claim of 
                                                 
10. The Supreme Court in House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536, 126 
S.Ct. 2064, 2076 (2006), characterized a claim of actual 
innocence as a “specific rule to implement” the cause and 




innocence by itself as a basis for granting him habeas corpus 
relief. 
 
 In an actual innocence gateway case a petitioner must 
demonstrate two things before his procedural default will be 
excused.  First, a petitioner must present new, reliable evidence 
that was not presented at trial.  Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 
S.Ct. at 865.  Second, a petitioner must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence, “that it is more likely than not 
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 




 B.  What is new evidence 
 
 In Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1230 (8th Cir. 
1997), a case on which respondents heavily rely, the Court said 
that “evidence is new only if it was not available at trial and 
could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of 
due diligence.”
12
  Respondents urge that we use this definition 
                                                 
 11. The Supreme Court explained in House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 
518, 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2078 (2006), that the actual innocence 
gateway “requires the federal court to assess how reasonable 
jurors would react to the overall, newly supplemented record.” 
 
12. In United States v. Davies, 394 F.3d 182, 191 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2005), we indicated that new evidence does not necessarily 
mean “newly discovered” evidence and may mean “newly 
presented” evidence.  Nevertheless, in that case we did “not 
weigh in . . . on the „newly presented‟ versus „newly discovered‟ 
issues” because we did not need to do so. 
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and conclude that Houck did not tender new evidence in the 
District Court as he could have discovered his newly presented 
affidavit evidence for use at the trial through the exercise of due 
diligence.  Houck is almost compelled  to agree in part with 
respondents because in his petition in the District Court he 
claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective because he should 
have discovered and then presented this evidence at the trial.  Of 
course, if this evidence had not been reasonably available before 
trial, trial counsel would not have been ineffective for failing to 
discover it and Houck‟s underlying ineffective assistance claim 
should have failed as, indeed, it did, though for jurisdictional 
and procedural reasons. 
 
 Yet arguably it is unfair to a petitioner to apply the 
Amrine statement of the law in cases in which the petitioner 
claims that he had had ineffective assistance of counsel by 
reason of his attorney not discovering exculpatory evidence 
when the petitioner is relying on that very evidence as being the 
evidence of actual innocence in a gateway case to reach the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  As we have indicated, 
the rule that Amrine sets forth requires a petitioner, such as 
Houck, in effect to contend that his trial counsel was not 
ineffective because otherwise the newly presented evidence 
cannot be new, reliable evidence for Schlup purposes. 
 
 We are not the first Court to recognize the petitioner‟s 
dilemma in the situation that we have described, for the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Gomez v. Jaimet indicated 
that:  “Particularly in a case where the underlying constitutional 
violation claimed is the ineffective assistance of counsel 
premised on a failure to present evidence, a requirement that 
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new evidence be unknown to the defense at the time of trial 
would operate as a roadblock to the actual innocence gateway.”  
350 F.3d 673, 679-80 (7th Cir. 2003).  The Gomez Court dealt 
with the problem by regarding evidence as new even if it was 
not newly discovered as long as it was “not presented to the trier 
of fact . . . . ”  Id. at 680.  Consequently, the Gomez Court 
indicated that a court can evaluate newly presented evidence in 
making a determination of whether the evidence is strong 
enough to establish the petitioner‟s actual innocence.  Id.   
 
 We believe, however, that Gomez‟s definition of “new” 
may be too expansive as it seems to go beyond what is needed to 
remedy the particular problem that that Court identified because 
it is not anchored to a claim that there had been ineffective 
assistance of counsel by reason of counsel‟s failure to present 
evidence of the petitioner‟s innocence.  On the other hand, the 
Amrine definition of what is new evidence may be too narrow as 
its adoption would mean that evidence that was not discovered 
by an ineffective counsel could not be new evidence even 
though the petitioner was relying on that very failure as the basis 
for his claim.  Overall we are inclined to accept the Amrine 
definition of new evidence with the narrow limitation that if the 
evidence was not discovered for use at trial because trial counsel 
was ineffective, the evidence may be regarded as new provided 




                                                 
13. The adoption of the modified Amrine definition would 
parallel our recognition in Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 
214 (3d Cir. 2007), that sometimes a court must get ahead of 




 Nevertheless, in this case we stop short of applying a 
modified Amrine standard because we need not do so in order to 
consider Houck‟s affidavits.  Instead, we will assume without 
deciding that Houck‟s affidavits constitute new evidence that we 
may consider on the merits in these proceedings.  We can make 
this assumption because, after our review of Houck‟s affidavits, 
we conclude, as will be seen below, that even taking into 
account this evidence he has not demonstrated that no 
reasonable juror would convict him after considering the newly 
supplemented record.  Thus, Houck has not satisfied the Schlup 
requirement to open the actual innocence door to allow his 
procedurally defaulted claims to be considered on the merits.
14
   
 
 C.  The Newly Presented Evidence 
 
 Houck submitted four affidavits, i.e., those of Consuella 
                                                                                                             
procedurally barred claims in a determination of whether a 
petitioner‟s claims meet the threshold Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and abuse-of-the-writ 
second petition standards governing whether procedurally 
barred claims may be considered. 
 
14. Although Amrine did include a claim that trial counsel 
was ineffective by reason of inadequate investigation with 
respect to certain witnesses who gave inculpatory evidence 
implicating the petitioner but who later recanted their 
incriminating testimony, the Court of Appeals did not address 




Simpson, Tequila Harris, Jeneen Askqua, and Kelly Edwards 
with his traverse, claiming them to be newly discovered 
evidence and thus, for our purposes, to be new, reliable 
evidence.  The affidavits of Simpson, Harris, and Askqua are 
nearly identical; each one states that Mt. Zion Christian 
Academy, where Houck asserted that he picked up his son on 
October 13, 1997, the day of the assault on Freeman, requires 
parents/guardians to sign a log book when picking up a student.  
In addition, Simpson‟s affidavit states that she saw Houck at the 
school with his son on October 13, 1997.  She, however, does 
not indicate the time of day that she saw Houck.  Edwards, who 
signed the fourth affidavit, indicated that she had witnessed 
Freeman‟s beating and that Houck was not one of his assailants. 
 
 D.  Houck‟s Newly Presented Evidence Would Not Sway 
a Reasonable Juror 
 
 The District Court in its order of August 15, 2005, 
adopting the magistrate judge‟s report and recommendation as 
the opinion of the Court, did not indicate that it had considered 
the four affidavits, even though Houck relied on the actual 
innocence doctrine in his objections to the report and 
recommendation, and the report and recommendation did not 
mention them either.
15
  Accordingly, it would be reasonable for 
                                                 
15. As we indicated above, in the order of August 15, 2005, 
adopting the report and recommendations as the opinion of 
the Court, the Court set forth that Houck had filed objections 





us to remand this case to the District Court with instructions to 
consider Houck‟s affidavits and then make an analysis of his 
claim of actual innocence.  Indeed, in his brief on this appeal 
Houck suggested this result as a possibility, and, at oral 
argument before us in response to our suggestion that a remand 
might be appropriate, Houck indicated that he would view that 
outcome as a reasonable result on this appeal. 
 
 Nevertheless, we have determined not to remand the 
matter.  To start with, the District Court decided the case 
without an evidentiary hearing, and thus that Court was in no 
better position to consider the newly presented evidence than we 
are.
16
  Second, though we could remand the matter for a plenary 
hearing at which the affiants could testify, we regard the newly 
presented evidence as too insubstantial to justify doing so.  In 
this regard, we are cognizant of the fact that Houck is seeking  a 
“rare” remedy that is only available in an “extraordinary” case, 
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321, 115 S.Ct. at 864; Hubbard, 378 F.3d at 
338, and thus we are reluctant to protract these proceedings and 
will address the significance vel non of the four affidavits 
ourselves. 
 
 1.  Simpson says that Houck was at his son‟s school 
 
                                                 
16. We note that Houck does not claim that he asked the 
District Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his 
petition.  In any event, we see no basis to conclude that the 
Court abused its discretion in not holding such a hearing and, 
as we explain above, we see no reason now to order that it do 
so.  See Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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 Simpson‟s affidavit dated 4/5/05 states that on October 
13, 1997, she picked up a child at Mt. Zion school and on that 
date at an unspecified time she observed Houck at the school 
with his son.  The affidavit, however, does not explain how she 
was able to identify Houck.  Moreover, Simpson does not 
explain the basis for her ability to identify someone she claims 
to have seen more than seven years earlier in what must have 
been an uneventful encounter.  Of course, the affidavit‟s failure 
to indicate the time of day that Simpson saw Houck is a critical 
omission because it is entirely possible that Houck picked up his 
child and, after dropping him off, joined in the assault on 
Freeman.  Clearly Simpson‟s affidavit is of limited value as it is 
unlikely it would convince a reasonable juror that Houck could 
not have been one of Freeman‟s assailants. 
 
 2.  The affidavits of Jeneen Askqua and Tequila Harris 
 
 The affidavits of Jeneen Askqua and Tequila Harris are 
of no value at all.
17
  Both merely state that on October 13, 1997, 
the affiant had a child enrolled at the Mt. Zion school and at that 
time the school required a person picking up a child to sign a log 
book verifying the date and time at which he or she picked up 
the child.  Neither affidavit even mentions Houck or suggests 
that he was at the school on October 13, 1997.
18
  We also note 
                                                 
17. Harris, who was Houck‟s fiancée, testified at the trial 
about what she observed after she returned home on the night 
of October 13, 1997, but did not mention the procedures at the 
Mt. Zion school.  
 
18. Harris indicates that her child, LaFond Houck, Jr., was 
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that Houck did not submit the log book to the District Court 
though he had had many years after his trial before he filed his 
petition in the District Court to attempt to obtain it.   
 
 Though a reading of the Askqua and Harris affidavits, 
and that of Simpson as well, reveals that they explained the 
student pick-up procedure at Mt. Zion and Houck‟s traverse 
focuses strongly on this procedure,  none of the affidavits stated 
that Houck signed the book or, if he did, what time he signed it. 
 We are simply told that there is a log book.
19
  We do not think 
that a reasonable juror would acquit Houck after hearing this 
evidence, especially in light of all the other evidence of his guilt. 
 
 3.  Witness Kelly Edwards says that Houck was not  
one of the assailants 
 
 Kelly Edwards‟ affidavit describes seeing the attack on 
Freeman and indicates that  Houck was not one of the attackers. 
 But the affidavit does not set forth the affiant‟s basis for that 
assertion.  This is an important omission inasmuch as the 
affidavit does not explain how the affiant knew and would have 
recognized Houck.  Moreover, witnesses at the trial testified that 
Freeman‟s assailants wore masks, surely an impediment to the 
                                                                                                             
enrolled at the school but does not say that Houck picked up 
the child on that day. 
 
19. At oral argument before us when the whereabouts of the 
log book was discussed, Houck speculated that it might be in 
the basement of the school.  Nevertheless, insofar as we are 
aware, Houck has not made any effort to obtain it. 
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assailants‟ identification.  If the assailants wore masks, it 
reasonably may be asked how did Edwards know that Houck 
was not one of them?  Clearly, we cannot conclude, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that a reasonable juror would 
acquit Houck after hearing Edwards‟ testimony.   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Houck has argued that his trial counsel was ineffective 
and that his appellate counsel compounded the error by failing to 
address the issue of the trial counsel‟s ineffectiveness.  
However, he did not raise the failings of trial counsel and 
appellate counsel during post-conviction relief proceedings in 
the Pennsylvania state courts with respect to the procedurally 
barred matters that he wishes the federal courts to consider.  
Nevertheless, Houck now asks us to excuse his procedural 
default based on the strength of newly presented evidence 
demonstrating his actual innocence.  We have examined that  
evidence and do not find it sufficient to invoke the rare and 
extraordinary remedy that Houck seeks, and accordingly, we 
will affirm the order of the District Court dated August 15, 
2005, and entered on August 16, 2005, denying his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.   
